Avant-propos: Les corrections nécessaires au mysticisme romantique.--Le mysticisme de la race. Les plus récents théoriciens du pangermanisme.--Un débat sur le mysticisme éstht́ique: Erwin Rohde et Fréderic Nietzsche.--Une doctrine du mysticisme social. Les étapes du Marxisme.--La doctrine morale de Tolstoï.--Appendice: I. Le mysticisme passionel. II. Un nouveau mysticisme social.--Table des matières.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Mind of Charles Hartshorne: A Critical Examination by Donald Wayne Viney and George W. ShieldsLeon NiemoczynskiThe Mind of Charles Hartshorne: A Critical Examination. Donald Wayne Viney and George W. Shields. Anoka, MN: Process Century Press, 2020. 584 pp. $40.00 cloth.Over the past decade process philosophy has undergone a significant renaissance most notably due to the towering presence of the thought of Alfred North Whitehead in that tradition. (...) Charles Hartshorne by manner of contrast has not had such a towering presence. Part of the reason this is the case is due to a paucity of introductory literature on the thought of Charles Hartshorne—literature that might contribute to a “starter kit” so to speak in mastering Hartshorne’s massive oeuvre. The Mind of Charles Hartshorne: A Critical Examination by Donald Wayne Viney and George W. Shields, both former students of Hartshorne and experts in process philosophy themselves, have authored a welcome contribution to an introductory literature that will most certainly elevate awareness of Hartshorne’s importance to its rightful place alongside that of Whitehead. The book is successful in its aims of “giving a reasonably comprehensive account of Hartshorne’s philosophy with an eye of presenting his best arguments...” (the “correcting what we see as misunderstandings of his views appearing in the critical literature” part may have been best left out) and “updating Hartshorne scholarship” (viii). There are ten chapters in total, appendix essays, the aforementioned bibliography, endnotes, and name and subject indexes.The Preface situates the mind of Charles Hartshorne as spanning the twentieth century and engaging metaphysics even when it was unfashionable to do so. Hartshorne thought about a wide-ranging and diverse range of subjects in both philosophy and science, aesthetics, metaphysics, applied philosophy, and theology. He never questioned modern science or evolution and believed that while metaphysics and empirical science have different methods each ensures its own way to objectivity. One learns that Hartshorne’s process metaphysics is also called “neo-classical” philosophy or speculative philosophy. His thought “gave full weight to the dynamic, relational, processive temporal and creative, affective dimensions of the universe” (vi). Hartshorne was known as much for his “panentheism,” or view that God transcends nature but also may be found immanently within it, as he was for his critique of traditional or scholastic classical theology—especially in his logic of theism where he recreates a modal version of the ontological argument. [End Page 94]Chapter 1, “The Career and Personality of Charles Hartshorne,” discusses just that. What seemed most important to me was the discussion of Hartshorne’s formative background of reading novels and poetry by Emerson, Melville, or Camus as a way of intensely living, his studying under William Ernest Hocking, and his Sheldon Traveling Fellowship where he studied for a time with Husserl and read and reviewed Heidegger. Probably the most important biographical details are that Hartshorne was given the assignment of editing the Peirce papers along with Paul Weiss as a Research Fellow while at Harvard University and he also met and graded for Whitehead, who along with C.S. Peirce, would become the twin pillars of all his thinking as a “Peircean and Whiteheadian” (11). From Peirce, we learn that Hartshorne took “possibility is best conceived of as a continuum with no least member” and from Whitehead, “actuality is discrete and discontinuous (atomistic), composed of momentary flashes of experiences” (11). For Hartshorne process and relativity are metaphysically basic.Chapter 2 begins with Hartshorne’s idea that, “Nature comes to us as constituted by feelings, not as constituted by lifeless, insentient matter” (28). Reality has an affective tone in which there is a layered complexity of feeling and social relation. In other words, contra Locke or Hume, feeling is objectively part of an objective affective continuum and is not nominalistically “painted on bare sense impressions” (46). Such might be described as a doctrine of “panexperientialism”— “the view that the basic constituents of reality are flashes of experience” (46). Experience and feeling stretch in their continuity to meet the bounds of nature. Chapter two continues with a wonderful discussion of Hartshorne’s aesthetics: “beauty is the mean between extremes” (48).Chapter 3 provides a... (shrink)

This book collects cutting edge essays on epistemic agency and related topics by distinguished senior contributors to epistemology, as well as rising figures in the field. The assembly of scholars is impressive, as is reflected by the quality and range of their contributions.

1. Le comte de Gobineau et l'arayanisme historique -- 2. Apôllon ou Dionysos : étude critique sur Fréderic Nietzsche et l'utilitarisme impérialiste -- 3. L'impérialisme démocratique -- 4. Le mal romantique essai sur l'impérialisme irrationnel.

Editions and translations were a major part of the work of French philosophers in the 19th century. They were not considered trivial tasks but philosophical works unto themselves. In this article, I show that to be considered as such, it is necessary to identify the reasons that would spark an author’s interest in the text he was publishing and the effects he expected from its publication in the philosophical field. I focus on the case of Blaise Pascal in the second (...) half of the 19th century. My goal is to underline that the matter of Pascal’s inclusion or exclusion from the philosophical “canon” led two philosophers, who were hostile to his thought, to publish Pascal’s Pensées: Ernest Havet and Léon Brunschvicg. Their aim was not to declare themselves “against” Pascal but rather to integrate their edition of his texts into their own philosophical projects. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to pinpoint the issues involved in the analysis of the economy of “primitive” societies, as carried out by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus. To do so it focuses on a logic of debt (Nietzsche) rather than on a logic of reciprocity (Lévi-Strauss). Deleuze and Guattari’s critical discussion of Lévi-Strauss’s ethnology can thus be related to the problematization of kinship, understood as a system of alliance and filiation relationships, which is formulated within French Marxist (...) anthropology (E. Terray, C. Meillassoux) on the one hand, and Edmund Leach’s critical anthropology on the other. This double mediation helps to show that in Anti-Oedipus, what Deleuze and Guattari seek to identify are the political strategies at work in economic relations. In the present instance, this means the finite alliance strategies operating in “primitive” societies and which are deeper than trade and production relationships. (shrink)

This article presents the implications, objectives and initial results of a current ethnographic research project on music lovers. It looks at problems of theory and method posed by such research if it is not conceived only as the explanation of external determinisms, relating taste to the social origins of the amateur or to the aesthetic properties of the works. Our aim is, on the contrary, from long interviews and observations undertaken with music lovers, mostly in the classical field, to concentrate (...) on gestures, objects, mediums, devices and relations engaged in a form of playing or listening, which amounts to more than the actualization of a taste `already there', for they are redefined during the action, with a result that is partly uncertain. This is why amateurs' attachments and ways of doing things can both engage and form subjectivities, rather than merely recording social labels, and have a history, irreducible to that of the taste for works. (shrink)

Bruno Latour’s writings have been discussed at length. My article proposes a ‘version’ of his career that emphasizes the obsessive permanence of his questioning, by focusing on the mission he set himself. Without presuming an a priori coherence, the religious and military connotations of the word ‘mission’ express the strong determination to act and the notion of a calling, and also the indeterminate nature of the object sought as well as the means of achieving it. As William James used to (...) write, the word ‘mission’ underlines the fact that very early on Latour wrote ‘for...’, not followed by an object complement: for something remaining undefined. His aim was neither to build a general theory, nor explain a specific field of activity, such as science, religion or politics, but to grasp things differently, in order to change ways of thinking and acting. And he did it. (shrink)

»Anhänglichkeiten« gehören nicht zum Vokabular der Handlungstheorie. Sie sind zugleich unbestimmte und fesselnde Fäden in Bünden, die alle irgendetwas bewirken, aber als einzelne nicht selbstgenügsam, nicht unabhängig sind. Anstatt eindeutig zwischen bestimmenden und abhängigen Dingen zu unterscheiden, geht der Beitrag zu einer weniger scharfen, aber unendlich produktiveren Ansatz über, der bestimmende Handlungen als ein in Netzwerken disseminiertes faire faire ([jemanden etwas] tun machen) auffasst. Wesentlich wäre dann nicht, sich von »Anhänglichkeiten« zu befreien, sondern die guten von den schlechten zu trennen, (...) nicht indem man auf großartige Prinzipien zurückgreift, sondern indem man sich der immanenten Gerechtigkeit der Dinge überlässt. Aber wie wäre die Qualität einer »Anhänglichkeit« zu beurteilen? Der Beitrag sucht anhand von Beispiel-fällen von Sportlern, Drogensüchtigen und Musikliebhabern eine Art »anhänglicher« Moral zu entwickeln, die aus dem Gewebe unhintergehbarer Bindungen gemacht wäre. »Attachments« do not belong to the vocabulary of action. Incommensurable and situational, they are at once constraining and indeterminate, deployed in bonds that all do something, but among which none is independent for itself. Instead of distinguishing clearly between dependent and determining things, the paper passes to a less trenchant but infinitely more productive approach to distributed action, conceived as a (make [someone] do [something]) disseminated in networks. The essential, then, is not to liberate oneself from the attachments, but to sort the good ones from the bad, by leaning not on grand overarching principles but on the immanent justice in things. But how can we judge the quality of an »attachment«? Drawing on cases of sportsmen, drug addicts, and music lovers, this contribution aims to clarify what an »attached« morality could look like, a morality which would be made of the fabric of uncircumventable ties. (shrink)

This article draws on recent transnational protests against police brutality to advance an understanding of anti-racist solidarity that aims to improve over Mara Marin’s ‘structural solidarity’ view. On Marin’s view, anti-racist solidarity is grounded in the racial structure. But Marin forgets that racial domination exerts a segregative influence on different groups, so that whites and middle-class blacks tend not to frequent the social milieux that would help them develop a sense of solidarity with working-class blacks. To address this problem, the (...) article hypothesises that the conditions for anti-racist solidarity are not inherent in the racial structure but created by social movements, as exemplified by Black Lives Matter: to the extent that white and middle-class black participants in the George Floyd protests experienced the racist police brutality they were denouncing on behalf of the black working class, these protests functioned as non-segregated milieux that could ground the solidarity of the former with the latter at the national and transnational levels. (shrink)

Ethics as a field should, we argue, pay more attention to the (eco)system. Van Rensselaer Potter, one of the pillars of contemporary bioethics, advocated for a global “bios” ethics that literally and metaphorically bridges the gap between biological knowledge and ethical reflection. However, a Potterian Bio-Ethics faces a major obstacle: its acentric focus. Consequently, Global Bio-Ethics remains opaque for those trained under the anthropocentric biomedical ethics that instrumentalizes the environment. This paper aims to demystify two key concepts—Globality and Complexity—and show (...) how a Potterian Bio-Ethics can effectively bridge the gap between knowledge-building in ecology and policy-making in the context of medical and environmental practices. Drawing on an experience in Québec, Canada, to mitigate the threat of antimicrobial resistance using a biosurveillance system, we show the utility of having ethics as an integral part of ecosystem(ic) approaches to bridge health and environment. We conclude by arguing that bioethics (and bioethicists) should become a locus for cascading communication, collaboration, and translation by co-constructing biosurveillance data governance. (shrink)

U.S. law imposes strict recording and reporting requirements on all entities that manufacture and distribute controlled substances. As a result, the prescription opioid crisis has unfolded in a data-saturated environment. This article asks why the systematic documentation of opioid transactions failed to prevent or mitigate the crisis. Drawing on a recently disclosed trove of 1.4 million internal records from Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals, a leading manufacturer of prescription opioids, we highlight a phenomenon we propose to call data diversion, whereby data ostensibly generated (...) or collected for the purpose of regulating the distribution of controlled substances were repurposed by the industry for the opposite aim of increasing sales at all costs. Systematic data diversion, we argue, contributed substantially to the scale of drug diversion seen with opioids and should become a focus of policy intervention. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the common claim that the ascription of ecological functions to organisms in functional ecology raises issues about levels of natural selection is ill-founded. This claim, I maintain, mistakenly assumes that the function concept as understood in functional ecology aligns with the selected effect theory of function advocated by many philosophers of biology (sometimes called “The Standard Line” on functions). After exploring the implications of Wilson and Sober’s defence of multilevel selection for the prospects of defending a (...) selected effect account of ecological functions, I identify three main ways in which functional ecology’s understanding of the function concept diverges from the selected effect theory. Specifically, I argue (1) that functional ecology conceives ecological functions as context-based rather than history-based properties of organisms; (2) that it attributes to the ecological function concept the aim of explaining ecosystem processes rather than with that of explaining the presence of organisms within ecosystems; and (3) that it conceives the ecological functions of organisms as use and service functions rather than design functions. I then discuss the extent to which the recently proposed causal role and organizational accounts of ecological functions better accord with the purposes for which the ecological concept is used in functional ecology. (shrink)

Synthetic biology aims at reconstructing life to put to the test the limits of our understanding. It is based on premises similar to those which permitted invention of computers, where a machine, which reproduces over time, runs a program, which replicates. The underlying heuristics explored here is that an authentic category of reality, information, must be coupled with the standard categories, matter, energy, space and time to account for what life is. The use of this still elusive category permits us (...) to interact with reality via construction of self-consistent models producing predictions which can be instantiated into experiments. While the present theory of information has much to say about the program, with the creative properties of recursivity at its heart, we almost entirely lack a theory of the information supporting the machine. We suggest that the program of life codes for processes meant to trap information which comes from the context provided by the environment of the machine. (shrink)

This paper reinforces the current consensus against the applicability of the selected effect theory of function in ecology. It does so by presenting an argument which, in contrast with the usual argument invoked in support of this consensus, is not based on claims about whether ecosystems are customary units of natural selection. Instead, the argument developed here is based on observations about the use of the function concept in functional ecology, and more specifically, research into the relationship between biodiversity and (...) ecosystem functioning. It is argued that a selected effect account of ecological functions is made implausible by the fact that it would conflict with important aspects of the understanding of function and ecosystem functional organization which underpins functional ecology’s research program. Specifically, it would conflict with (1) Functional ecology’s adoption of a context-based understanding of function and its aim to study the functional equivalence between phylogenetically-divergent organisms; (2) Functional ecology’s attribution to ecosystems of a lower degree of part-whole integration than the one found in paradigm individual organisms; and (3) Functional ecology’s adoption of a physiological or metabolic perspective on ecosystems rather than an evolutionary one. (shrink)

Assembly of minimal genomes revealed many genes encoding unknown functions. Three overlooked functional categories account for some of them. Cells are prone to make errors and age. As a first key function, discrimination between proper and changed entities is indispensable. Discrimination requires management of information, an authentic, yet abstract, cur- rency of reality. For example proteins age, sometimes very fast. The cell must identify, then get rid of old proteins without destroying young ones. Implementing discrimination in cells leads to the (...) second set of functions, usually ignored. Being abstract, information must nevertheless be embodied into material entities, with unavoidable idiosyncratic properties. This brings about novel unmet needs. Hence, the buildup of cells elicits specific but awkward material implementations, ‘kludges’ that become essential under particular settings, while difficult to identify. Finally, a third functional category char- acterizes the need for growth, with metabolic implementations allowing the cell to put together the growth of its cytoplasm, membranes, and genome, spanning different spatial dimensions. Solving this metabolic quandary, critical for engineering novel synthetic biology chassis, uncovered an unexpected role for CTP synthetase as the coordinator of nonhomothetic growth. Because a significant number of SynBio constructs aim at creating cell factories we expect that they will be attacked by viruses (it is not by chance that the function of the CRISPR system was identified in industrial settings). Substantiating the role of CTP, natural selection has dealt with this hurdle via synthesis of the antimetabolite 30-deoxy-30,40-didehydro- CTP, recruited for antiviral immunity in all domains of life. (shrink)

Surveillance programs supporting the management of One Health issues such as antibiotic resistance are complex systems in themselves. Designing ethical surveillance systems is thus a complex task (retroactive and iterative), yet one that is also complicated to implement and evaluate (e.g., sharing, collaboration, and governance). The governance of health surveillance requires attention to ethical concerns about data and knowledge (e.g., performance, trust, accountability, and transparency) and empowerment ethics, also referred to as a form of responsible self-governance. Ethics in reflexive governance (...) operates as a systematic critical-thinking procedure that aims to define its value: What are the “right” criteria to justify how to govern “good” actions for a “better” future? The objective is to lay the foundations for a methodological framework in empirical bioethics, the rudiments of which have been applied to a case study to building reflexive governance in One Health. This ongoing critical thinking process involves “mapping, framing, and shaping” the dynamics of interests and perspectives that could jeopardize a “better” future. This paper proposes to hybridize methods to combine insights from collective deliberation and expert evaluation through a reflexive governance functioning as a community-based action-ethics methodology. The intention is to empower individuals and associations in a dialogue with society, which operation is carried out using a case study approach on data sharing systems. We based our reasoning on a feasibility study conducted in Québec, Canada (2018–2021), envisioning an antibiotic use surveillance program in animal health for 2023. Using the adaptive cycle and governance techniques and perspectives, we synthesize an alternative governance model rooted in the value of empowerment. The framework, depicted as a new “research and design (R&D)” practice, is linking operation and innovation by bridging the gap between Reflexive, Evaluative, and Deliberative reasonings and by intellectualizing the management of democratizing critical thinking locally (collective ethics) by recognizing its context (social ethics). Drawing on the literature in One Health and sustainable development studies, this article describes how a communitarian and pragmatic approach can broaden the vision of feasibility studies to ease collaboration through public-private-academic partnerships. The result is a process that “reassembles” the One Health paradigm under the perspective of global bioethics to create bridges between the person and the ecosystem through pragmatic ethics. (shrink)

Professor Huerta de Soto has proposed a defense of the Euro using the argumentation of the Austrian School of economics. Huerta de Soto main argument relies on the federal monopoly of money is a preferable situation than the monetary nationalism that prevailed before. Our article aims to open a debate on the question of the Euro. The main argument used in the discussion relies on the fiscal question. Public deficits and public debts in the Euro zone seem to dominate monetary (...) institutions issues. (shrink)

In Out of This World, Peter Hallward argues that Deleuze's philosophy is, in spite of its proclaimed Nietzscheanism, intrinsically nihilistic. This article defends Deleuze against this accusation by reassessing his relationship to Nietzsche. I argue that both thinkers pose a similar problem, that of agency, and that the modus operandi of both for solving it relies on viewing agency as experimentation. The paper highlights the strong pragmatic dimension at play in Deleuze's philosophy: Deleuze aims to penetrate increasingly deeply into this (...) very world and to provide us with tools for intensifying our sensitivity to and engagement with it. To bring this into view, I offer a parallel reading of Nietzsche's and Deleuze's account of the production of our empirical experience, their critical stance towards such experience, and their means of overcoming it by engaging fully with problematic aspects of reality. (shrink)

Although Boorse’s and Wakefield’s accounts of health are generally regarded as competing ones, they are in fact so only if they are aimed at the same concept. Some remarks made by Boorse and Wakefield, however, leave it unclear whether they are. On one possible interpretation, Boorse’s account aims at analysing a theoreticalconcept of abnormality, which ought to be distinguished from a more clinicalor therapeuticconcept, whereas Wakefield’s account aims at analysing a clinicalor therapeuticconcept. The debate between Boorse and Wakefield would then (...) either be merely terminological, or would boil down to whether Boorse is correct to assert the existence of a theoreticalconcept of abnormality which ought to be distinguished from a clinicalor therapeuticone. This paper aims to clarify what is at stake between Boorse and Wakefield, by maintaining that their accounts are most plausibly interpreted as both being aimed towards a theoreticalconcept of abnormality. (shrink)

Resituating Descartes in any historical framework allows one to show how a radical philosophy was built against, but also along with, current and past doctrines. Taking seriously this intellectual struggle is worthwhile. But genetic analysis of the Cartesian corpus presents a real challenge. One pragmatic way of doing it is to begin with lexical clarification as proposed by Palkoska. His aim is to understand Descartes's conception of scientia, and to explain how cognition produces certain and evident true judgments. The main (...) contribution of the book is to carefully point out all the "inconsistencies" and even "conflicting... (shrink)